In “The Nyaya Sutras,” book V, Chapter I, Buddha lays out 24 seperate fallacious arguments, providing descriptions and examples for each. While several are slightly confusing and could use more support, they are, for the most part, both familiar and helpful. In Chapter II, he lays out 22 seperate instances when someone not only can but should be rebuked on the basis of their faulty argumentation. The 22nd of these, “semblance of a reason,” encompasse all of the fallacious arguments previously expounded in Chapter 1.

I found this second chapter particularly interesting because amidst a collection of valid and prevalent instances of actual occasions deserving rebuke, there are three particular occasions that seem both outlandish and unlikely. These are: the meaningless, the unintelligible, and the incoherent. By name alone, they appear to be relevant and likely, but by description, they take on an almost comic quality. The Meaningless seems to imply something trivial or non-sensical, but the example given, a response composed of random lettering, doesn’t seem like an actual or convincing attempt at argumentation. The unintelligible implies mumbling jumble not accompanied by any sense or reason, but the actual description expresses a non-comprehension by the audience and the opponent after three attempt which is an odd and arbitrary number. The Incoherent, by name, doesn’t imply anything differing from unintelligible, but the example given, “ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat’s skin and a lump of sweets” (171) is so specific, one has to wonder if it was once actually uttered by an opponent in an argument.

While these specific examples fit under the umbrella of the occasions they represent, they are farfetched. One has to wonder how often responses of this ridiculous nature were offered as a genuine attempt at refuting an argument. One is also forced to conclude that they occurred often enough, that Buddha saw fit to include them as instances meriting and requiring of rebuke. Moreover, they are sandwiched in between a slew of more serious and realistic examples which leads the reader to wonder about their intended relevance and importance. While I was reading these particular examples, I found myself simultaneously thinking about the warning labels pasted all over consumer that also seem outlandish but must have earned their presence by some actual occurence: the baby drowning in the vat of pickles is one of my personal favorites. I certainly don’t mean to make light of Buddha’s argument in this piece, but I am certainly curious about the frequency of the outlandish arguments highlighted in this piece.