In “Rethinking Rhetoric from an Indian Perspective,” Keith Lloyd argues for the inclusion of the Nyaya Sutra text, an ancient Indian debate manual, in the field of rhetorical study. Lloyd claims that the reasoning patterns included in this text, which have long been considered a lesser version of the Aristotelian syllogism by Western scholars of logic, actually represent an important alternative approach to reasoning. “The Indian reluctance to abstract logic from context, a weakness in terms of formal logic, actually foreshadows the emergence of ‘informal’ logic that appears in the West mid-century” (374). The West, in its ethnocentrism, has, from Lloyd’s perspective, ignored prescient alternatives.
The goal of Nyaya, according to Lloyd, is “not self-expression, persuasion, or winning,” but a “seeing together,” a “common search for enlightenment,” or a “knowing episode” (prama) (375). The Nyaya offers us an alternative approach to reasoning which might be more helpful than the Aristotelian tradition in our conflict-filled yet interconnected postmodern world.
In the traditional Greek syllogism, deductive logic brings us from a general premise through a specific example-anchored minor premise and finally to a deductive conclusion connecting the two. In Nyaya, unlike with an Aristotelian syllogism, the underlying, general premise is left out, and instead a specific premise from one example is posited. The concrete example, not the abstraction, makes the point. In the Nyaya tradition, the reaffirmation (“this is the case”) is an assertion of a shared “knowing episode.” In Aristotelian syllogisms, valid but untruthful claims may be made as an exercise in logical abstraction because validity and truth are separated, but in Nyaya, the truth of the examples is part of their validity. With a shift in rhetorical perspective, using the Nyaya tradition, individuals may share a “knowing episode” without necessarily agreeing on the same underlying premise.
In our postmodern world, this alternative rhetoric represents the possibility of communality without sharing the same perspective. In the Nyaya tradition, individuals may share observations and understandings while still entertaining differing underlying principles. These opposing principles or warrants do not need to be expressed to come to conclusions and make decisions. Common ground and harmony may be found in spite of differences because the discussion isn’t begun with the idea that one side must persuade the other to change underlying beliefs.
Lloyd’s argument is nuanced and represents a rhetorical shift in perspective if we are to experience the Nyaya rhetorical process. Envisioning this shift is a reminder of how used to our own perspectives and thinking patterns we become. Like a fish in water, we live and breathe by the thinking patterns of our culture and are unaware of them. It’s easy, after wrestling to grasp this alternative mindset, to understand how insidious ethnocentrism can be. Language and rhetoric shape our thoughts and ourselves. Studying other cultural rhetorical patterns, and truly trying to immerse ourselves in these thinking patterns, is an important exercise in moving beyond ethnocentrism to understanding the world.
Lisa,
We read the same article, but you really articulated the essence of what Lloyd was saying. Ethnocentrism is the problem with comparative rhetoric. The west thinks the rest of the world is wrong. Well, as Lloyd points out, perception is just as important in human interactions as persuasive logic.
Well done!
Mike Calou