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THE  
NYĀYA SUTRĀS OF GOTAMA

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साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्णवर्णविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्य-  
प्राप्तिप्रसङ्ग प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्यविशेषो-  
पपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य कार्यसमाः ॥ ५ । १ । १ ॥

1. Futilities are as follows:—(1) Balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter-example, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference, (19) balancing the demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.—1.

Futility, which is a fallacious argument, has been in general terms defined in aphorism 1-2-18. The twenty four kinds of futility enunciated here will each be defined in due course. The fallacious characters of the twenty four kinds will also be exposed in separate aphorisms.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तद्धर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः  
साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमौ ॥ ५ । १ । २ ॥

2. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called "balancing the homogeneity" or "balancing the heterogeneity."—2.

*Balancing the homogeneity.*—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is incorporeal,  
like the sky.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the homogeneity of sound with the non-eternal pot on the ground of both being products. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be based on the homogeneity of sound with the eternal sky on the alleged ground of both being incorporeal. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the homogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.

*Balancing the heterogeneity.*—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
whatever is not non-eternal is not a product,  
as the sky.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is incorporeal,  
whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal,  
as a pot.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-non-eternal sky which are mutually incompatible. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot which are alleged to be incompatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the heterogeneity" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them.

गोत्वाद्गोसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १ । ३ ॥

3. That is, we say, to be established like a cow through cowhood (or cow-type).—3.

The Naiyāyika says:—If the opposition referred to in the previous aphorism is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument—“sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot” the homogeneous example “pot” exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal; but in the opposition—“sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky”—the homogeneous example sky does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal. A similar observation is to be made with regard to the opposition called “balancing the heterogeneity.” In the opposition “sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot” the heterogeneous example pot does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षापक-  
र्षवर्गवर्गविकल्पसाध्यसमाः ॥ ५ । १ । ४ ॥

4. The subject and example alternating their characters or both standing in need of proof, there occur (futilities called) “balancing an addition” “balancing a subtraction” “balancing the questionable,” “balancing the unquestionable” “balancing the alternative” and “balancing the reciprocity.”—4.

*Balancing an addition.*—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called “balancing an addition.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is non-eternal (and corporeal),  
because it is a product,  
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal).

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it must also be corporeal like it: if it is not corporeal let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing an addition” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

*Balancing a subtraction.*—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called “balancing a subtraction.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is non-eternal (but not audible),  
because it is a product,  
like a pot (which is non-eternal but not audible).

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it cannot be audible, for a pot is not audible; and if sound is still held to be audible, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing a subtraction” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of a certain character wanting in the example (and consequently also in the subject),

*Balancing the questionable.*—If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called “balancing the questionable.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

A pot is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

*Balancing the unquestionable.*—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the unquestionable."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

A pot is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of a pot is held to be unquestionable, why is not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to render the argument unnecessary on the ground of its subject being of an unquestionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the unquestionable" which aims at showing the equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the example as well as of the subject.

*Balancing the alternative.*—If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative characters to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal and formless,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot (which is non-eternal and has forms).

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound are both products, yet one has form and the other is formless: why on the same principle is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal? This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and example.

*Balancing the reciprocity.*—If one opposes an argument by alleging a reciprocity of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the reciprocity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

A pot is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like sound.

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound being both products, one requires proof for its non-eternality as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot is to be proved non-eternal by the examples of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternality or non-eternality of sound. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the reciprocity" which brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारसिद्धेर्वैधर्म्यादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । ५ ॥

5. This is, we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality of their characters.—5.

The Naiyāyika says :—The futilities called "balancing an addition," "balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing

the unquestionable" and "balancing the alternative" are all based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters.

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

In this argument although there is an equality of "sound" and "pot" in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a *bos gavaeus* but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he bears in mind the equality of the subject and the example only in those characters which are warranted by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called "balancing an addition" it is clear that the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (*viz.* being a product), because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal. Similarly with regard to the futility called "balancing a subtraction," the reason (*viz.* being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in respect of their being not audible. As regards the futilities called "balancing the questionable" and "balancing the unquestionable," we cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called "balancing the alternative" introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (*viz.* being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason *viz.* being a product.

साध्यातिदेशाच्च दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

6. And because the example happens to surpass the subject.—6

The futility called "balancing the reciprocity" is based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as the subject. But that one surpasses the other is evident from aphorism 1-1-25 which states that the example does not stand in need of proof as to its characters.

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

In this argument sound (the subject) may not be known by some to be non-eternal but a pot (the example) is known by all to be a product as well as non-eternal. "Balancing the reciprocity" is therefore a fallacious argument.

प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्या अविशिष्टत्वादप्राप्या  
असाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्यप्राप्तिसमौ ॥ ५ । १ । ७ ॥

7. If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence" or "balancing the mutual absence."—7.

*Balancing the co-presence.*—If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire,  
because it has smoke,  
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke,  
because it has fire,  
like a kitchen.

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or is absent from that site. If the smoke is present with fire at the same site, there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is, in his opinion, as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence" which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

*Balancing the mutual absence.*—If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called “balancing the mutual absence.”

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows :—

The hill has fire,  
because it has smoke,  
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The hill has smoke,  
because it has fire,  
like a kitchen.

The opponent asks : “Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?” “Such a supposition is indeed absurd.” The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the mutual absence” which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । ८ ॥

8. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells.—8.

A potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his reach but an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance. Hence it is clear that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site and sometimes by being absent from it. “Balancing the co-presence” and “balancing the mutual absence” which attach an undue importance to the proximity or remoteness of sites, are therefore totally fallacious arguments.

दृष्टान्तस्य करणानपदेशात् प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमो ॥ ५ । १ । ९ ॥

9. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example, the opposition will be called “balancing the infinite regression” or “balancing the counter-example.”—9.

*Balancing the infinite regression.*—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is to be proved by further reasons. This gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition “sound is non-eternal” not less than the proposition “sound is eternal.” This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the infinite regression” which aims at stopping an argument by introducing an infinite regression which is said to beset the example.

*Balancing the counter-example.*—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, why it should not be held to be eternal by the example of the sky? If the example of the sky is set aside, let the example of the pot too be set aside. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the counter-example” which aims at setting aside an argument by the introduction of a counter-example.

प्रदापादानप्रसङ्गनिवृत्तिवत्तद्विनिवृत्तिः ॥ ५ । १ । १० ॥

10. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.—10.

The Naiyāyika says :—

An example is a thing the characters of which are well-known to an ordinary man as well as to an expert. It does not require a series of reasons to reveal its own character or to reveal the character of the subject with which it stands in the relation of homogeneity or heterogeneity. In this respect it resembles a lamp which illumines itself as well as the things lying within its reach.

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

In this argument the pot is the example which is so well-known that it requires no proof as to its being a product or being non-eternal.

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुर्दृष्टान्तः ॥ ५ । १ । ११ ॥

11. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter-example is advanced as the reason.—11.

The Naiyāyika says :—

The opponent must give a special reason why the counter-example should be taken as specially fitted to lead to a conclusion, and the example should not be taken as such. Until such a special reason is given, the counter-example cannot be accepted as leading to a definite conclusion. In fact a mere counter-example without a reason (middle term) attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. Hence we must rely on an example attended by reason but not on a counter-example unattended by reason.

Sound is eternal,  
like the sky.

This opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example is therefore to be rejected as unreasonable.

प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १२ ॥

12. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-produced."

A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is a non-effect of effort,  
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, viz., being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, viz., sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being non-eternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-produced" which pretends to show an equality of the arguments of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । १३ ॥

13. This is, we say, no opposition against our reason so well predicable of the subject which becomes as such only when it is produced.—13.

The Naiyāyika disposes of the futile opposition called "balancing the non-produced" by stating that the subject can become as such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition, viz., "sound (while non-produced) is eternal, because it is not then an effect of effort," carries no weight with it, since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound, while it is produced, is certainly an effect of effort and as such is non-eternal.

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरेन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् संशयसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १४ ॥

14. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal consequent on the example and its genus (or

type) being equally objects of perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the doubt."—14.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is non-eternal or eternal (?)  
because it is an object of perception,  
like a pot or pot-ness.

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot-ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception ; but the pot being non-eternal and pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the doubt" which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the-eternal and the non-eternal.

साधम्मर्यात्संशये न संशयो वैधम्मर्यादुभयथा वा संशयेऽ  
त्यन्तसंशयो नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च \*सामान्यस्याप्रतिषेधः

॥ ५ । १ । १५ ॥

15. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus : a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.—15.

The Naiyāyika says :—

Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) but it must be pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. Though on the score of homogeneity we may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in

\*The term *sāmānya* in the sense of "general notion, genus or type" was evidently taken from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

respect of its homogeneity with as well as heterogeneity from other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

उभयसाधम्मर्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १६ ॥

16. "Balancing the controversy" is an opposition which is conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.—16.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is audible,  
like soundness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, *viz.* sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, *viz.*, audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), provokes the very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the controversy" which hurts an argument by giving rise to the very controversy which was to be settled.

प्रतिपक्षात् प्रकरणसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः

॥ ५ । १ । १७ ॥

17. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side.—17.

The Naiyāyika says :—The opposition called "balancing the controversy" cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १८ ॥

18. "Balancing the non-reason" is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.—18.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

Here "being a product" is the reason or sign for "being non-eternal" which is the predicate or significate.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate.

(a) The reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or significate) because the former gets its name only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishment of the predicate.

(b) The reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate) because what would be the use of the former if it latter existed already.

(c) The reason (or sign) and the predicate (or significate) cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-reason" which aims at setting aside an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

**न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्वैकाल्यासिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १ । १६ ॥**

19. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.—19.

The Naiyayika says :—The knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which is to be established take place from reason which must precede that which is to be known and that which is to be established.

**प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २० ॥**

20. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.—20.

It being impossible for the opposition to precede, succeed or be simultaneous with that which is to be opposed, the opposition itself is invalid and consequently the original argument holds good.

**अर्थापत्तितः प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २१ ॥**

21. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption, the opposition will be called "balancing the presumption."—21.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound is presumed to be eternal,  
because it is incorporeal,  
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal on account of its homogeneity with non-eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being incorporeal). This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the presumption" which aims at stopping an argument by setting presumption as a balance against it.

**अनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः पक्षहानेरुपपत्तिरनुक्तत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वाच्चा-  
र्थापत्तेः ॥ ५ । १ । २२ ॥**

22. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion.—22.

Sound is eternal,  
because it is incorporeal,  
like the sky.

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion :—

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

This would hurt the opposition itself. In fact the presumption as adduced by the opponent is erratic. If one says that "sound is non-eternal because of its homogeneity with non-eternal things", the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things" and *vice versa*. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable.

**एकधर्मोपपत्तेरविशेषे सर्वाविशेषप्रसङ्गात् सद्भावोपपत्ते-  
रविशेषसमः ॥ ५।१।२३ ॥**

23. If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property on account of their being existent: this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."—23.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If the pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality in consequence of their both being products, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property in consequence of their being existent. Therefore, no difference existing between the eternal and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference" which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

**क्वचिद्धर्मानुपपत्तेः क्वचिच्चोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥ ५।१।२४ ॥**

24. This is, we say, no opposition because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example

happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in other instances not to abide in it.—24.

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different in consequence of their being existent, we would like to know in what respect they are non-different. If they are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality, then the argument would stand thus:—

All things are non-eternal,  
because they are existent,  
like (?)

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is nothing left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternality abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent things. Hence all things are not mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing the non-difference" is unreasonable.

**उभयकारणोपपत्तेरुपपत्तिसमः ॥ ५।१।२५ ॥**

25. If an opposition is offered by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration."—25.

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sound as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternality of sound as follows:—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is incorporeal,  
like the sky.

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternality

of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration."

**उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २६ ॥**

26. This is, we say, no opposition because there is an admission of the first demonstration.—26.

The Naiyāyika says :—

The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound. If to avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he now denies the reason which supports non-eternality we would ask why does he not deny the other reason which supports the eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called "balancing the demonstration" is not well-founded.

**निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २७ ॥**

27. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called "balancing the perception."—27.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is a product, for we *perceive* that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the perception" which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up an act of perception as a balance against it.

**कारणान्तरादपि तद्धर्मोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २८ ॥**

28. This is, we say, no opposition because that character can be ascertained by other means as well.—28.

The Naiyāyika says that the argument, *viz.*, "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot," implies that sound is proved to be

non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

**तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुपलब्धिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २९ ॥**

29. If against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-perception."—29.

In aphorism 2-2-19 the Naiyāyika has stated that there is no veil which covers sound for we do not perceive such a veil. In aphorism 2-2-20 his opponent has stated that there is a veil because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof. If the non-perception of a thing proves its non-existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in the opinion of the opponent, prove the existence of the thing. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-perception" which aims at counteracting an argument by setting up non-perception as a balance against it.

**अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनूपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ५ । १ । ३० ॥**

30. The reasoning through non-perception is not, we say, sound, because non-perception is merely the negation of perception.—30.

The Naiyāyika says :—Perception refers to that which is existent while non-perception to that which is non-existent. The non-perception of non-perception which signifies a mere negation of non-perception cannot be interpreted as referring to an existent thing. Hence the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" is not well-founded.

**ज्ञानविकल्पानाञ्च भावाभावसंवेदनादध्यात्मम् ॥ ५ । १ । ३१ ॥**

31. There is, moreover, an internal perception of the existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds of knowledge.—31.

There are internal perceptions of such forms as "I am sure," "I am not sure," "I have doubt," "I have no doubt" etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence

thereof. Hence the non-perception itself is perceptible, and as there is no non-perception of non-perception, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" falls to the ground.

साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः ॥

५ । १ । ३२ ॥

32. If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argument by attributing non-eternality to all things, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-eternality."—32.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

If sound is non-eternal on account of its being homogeneous with a pot which is non-eternal, it will follow as a consequence that all things are non-eternal because they are in some one or other respect homogeneous with the pot—a consequence which will render all inferences impossible for want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-eternal" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्याच्च ॥

५ । १ । ३३ ॥

33. The opposition, we say, is unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is opposed.—33.

The Naiyāyika says :—

We cannot ascertain the character of a thing from its mere homogeneity with another thing: in doing so we must consider the logical connection between the reason and the predicate. Sound, for instance, is non-eternal not merely because it is homogeneous with a non-eternal pot but because there is a universal connection between "being a product" and "being non-eternal." Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homo-

geneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore not founded on a sound basis.

दृष्टान्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वा-  
त्तस्य चोभयथाभावान्नाविशेषः ॥ ५ । १ । ३४ ॥

34. There is, we say, no non-distinction, because the reason is known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the predicate and because it is applied in both ways.—34.

The Naiyāyika says that we are not justified in concluding that all things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which "all things" may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion we must consider the reason as being that character of the example (and consequently of the subject) which bears a universal connection with the character of the predicate. The pot possesses no such character in common with "all things." The reason moreover is applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous ways. We cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the subject with the example in a certain respect. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore unreasonable.

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः ॥ ५ । १ । ३५ ॥

35. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non-eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non-eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."—35.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is a product,  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—You say that sound is non-eternal. Does this non-eternality exist in sound always or only sometimes? If the non-eternality exists *always*, the sound must also be always existent, or in other words, sound is eternal. If the non-eternality exists only *sometimes*, then too the sound must in the absence

of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the eternal" which counteracts an argument by setting up eternality as a balance against it.

प्रतिषेधे नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये . नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः  
प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥ ५ । १ । ३६ ॥

36. This is, we say, no opposition because the thing opposed is always non-eternal on account of the eternality of the non-eternal.—36.

The Naiyāyika says :—

By speaking of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be *always* non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other : by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition.

प्रयत्नकार्यनिकत्वात्कार्यसमः ॥ ५ । १ । ३७ ॥

37. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition will be called "balancing the effect."—37.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The effect of effort is found to be of two kinds, *viz.* (1) the production of something which was previously non-existent, *e.g.* a pot, and (2) the revelation of something already existent, *e.g.* water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind? If sound is an effect of the first kind it will be non-eternal but if it is of the second kind it will be eternal. Owing to this diversity of the effects of effort, it is not possible to conclude that sound is non-eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the effect."

कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः ॥ ५ ।  
१ । ३८ ॥

38. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect, because there was no cause of non-perception.—38.

The Naiyāyika answers the opposition called "balancing the effect" as follows :—

We cannot say that sound is revealed by our effort because we are unable to prove that it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but produced.

प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः ॥ ५ । १ । ३९ ॥

39. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.—39.

A certain person argued :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person opposed it saying that sound would not be non-eternal if "effect" meant a thing revealed.

The Naiyāyika observes that if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special ground to suppose that the "effect" in the argument signified "a thing produced and not revealed," so also there is no special ground to suppose that the word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect" is self-destructive.

सर्वत्रैवम् ॥ ५ । १ । ४० ॥

40. Thus everywhere.—40.

If a special meaning is to be attached to the opposition, the same meaning will have to be attached to the original argument. In this respect there will be an equality of the two sides in the case of all kinds of opposition such as "balancing the homogeneity" etc.

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषवदोषः ॥ ५ । १ । ४१ ॥

41. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.—41.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here "effect" may mean "a thing revealed by effort.")

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced by effort.")

The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean a thing revealed by effort). So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

**प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोष-  
प्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ ५ । १ । ४२ ॥**

42. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion."—52.

A certain person lays down a proposition which is opposed by a certain other person. The first person, *viz.* the disputant charges the opposition made by the second person, *viz.* the opponent, with a defect *e.g.* that the reason is erratic. The opponent instead of rescuing his opposition from the defect with which it has been charged by the disputant, goes on charging the disputant's opposition of the opposition with the same defect. The counter-charge which the opponent brings in this way is interpreted by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called "admission of an opinion."

**स्वपक्षक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे परपक्षदोषाभ्यु-  
पगमात्समानो दोष इति ॥ ५ । १ । ४३ ॥**

43. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.

*Six-winged disputation* (Ṣaṭpakṣi kathā).

Disputant—to prove the non-eternality of sound says :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

*This is the first wing.*

Opponent—seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here "effect" means a thing which already existed and is now revealed by effort).

*This is the second wing.*

Disputant—seeing that the reason "effect" is erratic, charges the opposition with a defect thus :—

Sound is *not* eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here the reason "effect" is erratic meaning (1) either a thing that did not previously exist and is now produced (2) or a thing that already existed and is now revealed by effort).

*This is the third wing.*

Opponent—finding that the reason "effect," which is erratic, proves neither the eternality nor the non-eternality of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus :—

Sound is also *not* non-eternal,  
because it is an effect of effort.

He alleges that the defect (*viz.* the erraticity of the reason) with which his opposition (*viz.* sound is eternal) is charged, also attaches to the opposition of the opposition made by the disputant (*viz.* sound is *not* eternal or non-eternal).

*This is the fourth wing.*

Disputant—finding that the counter-charge brought against him amounts to his opponent's admission of self-defect says :—

The opponent by saying that "sound is also not non-eternal" has admitted that it is also not eternal. In other words the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant's opinion.

*This is the fifth wing.*

Opponent—finding that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument from the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent's admission of the charge says :—

The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has admitted that it is also not non-eternal. In other words, if the counter-

charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

This is the sixth wing.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. The sixth wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of "admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential.

The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special meaning, *viz.*, a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.

The disputant and the opponent instead of stopping at the proper limit has carried on their disputation through six wings beyond which no further wing is possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.

## BOOK V.—CHAPTER II.

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थक्यमप्राप्तकालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विज्ञेपो मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ॥ ५ । २ । १ ॥

1. The occasions for rebuke are the following:—

1. Hurting the proposition, 2. Shifting the proposition, 3. Opposing the proposition, 4. Renouncing the proposition, 5. Shifting the reason, 6. Shifting the topic, 7. The meaningless, 8. The unintelligible, 9. The incoherent, 10. The inopportune, 11. Saying too little, 12. Saying too much, 13. Repetition, 14. Silence, 15. Ignorance, 16. Non-ingenuity, 17. Evasion, 18. Admission of an opinion, 19. Overlooking the censurable, 20. Censuring the non-censurable, 21. Deviating from a tenet, and 22. The semblance of a reason.—44.

The definition of "an occasion for rebuke" has been given in aphorism 1-2-19. "An occasion for rebuke" which is the same as "a ground of defeat", "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally in connection with the proposition or any other part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is a discutient, wrangler or caviller.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥ ५ । २ । २ ॥

2. "Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter-example.—45.

A disputant argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,  
Because it is cognisable by sense,  
Whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal  
as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense,  
Therefore sound is non-eternal.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

A genus (e.g., potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense, is found to be eternal, why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by sense, be eternal ?

The disputant being thus opposed says :—

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal  
as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense,  
Therefore sound is eternal.

By thus admitting in his example (pot) the character of a counter-example (genus or type), he has hurt his own proposition (viz. sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

**प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा-  
न्तरम् ॥ ५ । २ । ३ ॥**

3. "Shifting the proposition" arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter-example.—46.

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is cognisable by sense  
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,  
because it is cognisable by sense like a genus (or type).

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and the other is not so : hence the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition. The proposition originally laid down was :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
while the proposition now defended is :

Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

A person who shifts his proposition in this way is to be rebuked in as much as he has not relied upon his original reason and example.

**प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः ॥ ५ । २ । ४ ॥**

4. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.—47.

Substance is distinct from quality,  
because it is perceived to be non-distinct from colour etc.

In this argument it is to be observed that if substance is distinct from quality, it must also be distinct from colour etc. which constitute the quality. The reason viz. substance is non-distinct from colour etc., is opposed to the proposition, viz. substance is distinct from quality. A person who thus employs a reason which opposes his proposition is to be rebuked as a fool.

**पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः ॥ ५ । २ । ५ ॥**

5. A proposition being opposed if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."—48.

A certain person argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is cognisable by sense,

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so a sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal. The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the meaning of his proposition thus :—

"Who says that sound is non-eternal ?

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called "renouncing the proposition" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

**अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषेधे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम् ॥**

**५ । २ । ६ ॥**

6. "Shifting the reason" occurs when the reason of a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it.—49.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,  
because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person says that sound cannot be proved to be non-eternal through the mere reason of its being cognisable by sense, just as a genus (or type) such as pot-ness (or pot-type is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal.

The first person defends himself by saying that the reason, viz. being cognisable by sense, is to be understood as signifying that which comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisable by sense. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same time cognisable by sense ; but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pot-type does not come under another genus or type (such as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type) though it is cognisable by sense. Such a defence, which consists in shifting one's reason, rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् ॥ ५ । २ । ७ ॥

7. "Shifting the topic" is an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant.—50.

A certain person, to prove the eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is eternal (proposition),  
because it is intangible (reason).

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence of any other resource, to defend his position as follows:—

*Hetu*, which is the sanskrit equivalent for "reason," is a word derived from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be a noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc. etc.

The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् ॥ ५ । २ । ८ ॥

8. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters into a series.—51.

A certain person, to prove the eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is eternal,  
because k, c, ṭ, t and p are j, v, g, ḍ and d,  
like jh, bh, gh, ḍh and dh.

As the letters k, c, ṭ etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम् ॥

५ । २ । ९ ॥

9. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.—52.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "the unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमपार्थकम् ॥ ५ । २ । १० ॥

10. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.—53.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defence, argues as follows:—

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke.

अवयवविपर्यासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् ॥ ५ । २ । ११ ॥

11. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.—54.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire (proposition).  
Whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example).  
Because it has smoke (reason).  
The hill has fire (conclusion).  
The hill has smoke (application).

This sort of argument is called "the inopportune" which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke. Since the meaning of an argument is affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who overlooks the order cannot establish his conclusion and is therefore rebuked.

हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् ॥ ५ । २ । १२ ॥

12. If an argument lacks even one of its parts, it is called "saying too little."—55.

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts:—

1. The hill has fire (proposition),
2. Because it has smoke (reason),
3. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
4. The hill has smoke (application),
5. Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

As all the five parts or members are essential, a person who omits even one of them should be scolded as "saying too little."

हेतूदाहरणाधिकमधिकम् ॥ ५ । २ । १३ ॥

13. "Saying too much" is an argument which consists of more than one reason or example.—56.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—

- The hill has fire (proposition),  
Because it has smoke (reason),  
And because it has light (reason),  
like a kitchen (example),  
and like a furnace (example),

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person, who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage), employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much."

शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् ॥ ५ । २ । १४ ॥

14. "Repetition" is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcation) the word or the meaning is said over again.—57.

*Repetition of the word*—Sound is non-eternal,  
sound is non-eternal.

*Repetition of the meaning*—Sound is non-eternal,  
echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent, etc.

A person who unnecessarily commits repetition is to be rebuked as a fool.

Reinculcation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-66.

अनुवादे त्वपुनरुक्तं शब्दाभ्यासादर्थविशेषोपपत्तेः ॥ ५ । २ । १५ ॥

15. In reinculcation there is no repetition in as much as a special meaning is deduced from the word which is repeated.—58.

- The hill has fire (proposition),  
Because it has smoke (reason),  
All that has smoke has fire  
as a kitchen (example),  
The hill has smoke (application),  
Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

In this argument the "conclusion" is a mere repetition of the "proposition" and yet it serves a special purpose.

अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनम् ॥ ५ । २ । १६ ॥

16. "Repetition" consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.—59.

"A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal"—this is a mere repetition of the following:—

"A thing not possessing the character of a product is not non-eternal."

विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्याप्यनुच्चारणमननुभाषणम् ॥ ५ । २ । १७ ॥

17. "Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.—60.

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent is therefore to be rebuked.

अविज्ञातश्चाज्ञानम् ॥ ५ । २ । १८ ॥

18. "Ignorance" is the non-understanding of a proposition.—61.

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the know-

ledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand? He is to be rebuked for his ignorance.

उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा ॥ ५ । २ । १६ ॥

19. "Non-ingenuity" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.—62.

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity.

कार्यं व्यासङ्गात् कथाविच्छेदो वित्तेपः ॥ ५ । २ । २० ॥

20. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend another business.—63.

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion.

स्वपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ ५ । २ । २१ ॥

21. "The admission of an opinion" consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists in one's own side.—64.

A certain person addressing another person says:—"You are a thief."

The other person replies:—"You too are a thief."

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of "admission of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it.

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ ५ । २ । २२ ॥

22. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.—65.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his short-coming, it is the duty of the audience to pass a

vote of censure on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the censurable."

अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥

५ । २ । २३ ॥

23. "Censuring the non-censurable" consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.—66.

A person brings discredit on himself if he rebukes a person who does not deserve rebuke.

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५ । २ । २४ ॥

24. A person who after accepting a tenet departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."—67.

A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sāṅkhya philosophy which lays down that (1) what is existent never becomes non-existent, and (2) what is non-existent never comes into existence etc. A certain other person opposes him by saying that all human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and non-existence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.

हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः ॥ ५ । २ । २५ ॥

25. "The fallacies of a reason" already explained do also furnish occasions for rebuke.—68.

From aphorism 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere semblances of a reason. A person who employs them in a disputation do certainly deserve rebuke.

There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.

Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect in the operator (officiating priest) consists in his not being a learned man, and defect in the materials consists in the fuel being wet, butter being not fresh, remuneration (to the officiating priest) being small, etc. A son is sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice if these defects are avoided. Therefore there is no untruth in the Veda.

**अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ २।१।६०॥**

121. Contradiction would occur if there were alteration of the time agreed upon.—60.

Let a person perform sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times. Two alternative courses being open to him he can perform the sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise according to his agreement or desire. The Veda cannot be charged with the fault of contradiction if it enjoins such alternative courses.

**अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २।१।६१॥**

122. There is no tautology, because re-inculcation is of advantage.—61.

Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the Veda. If there is any repetition there it is either for completing a certain number of syllables, or for explaining a matter briefly expressed, etc. "Let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice"—such instances embody a useful repetition.

**वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात् ॥ २।१।६२॥**

123. And because there is necessity for the classification of Vedic speech.—62.

It is necessary to divide the Vedic speech into classes based on special characters.

**विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ २।१।६३॥**

124. The Vedic speech being divided on the principle of injunction, persuasion and re-inculcation.—63.

The two main divisions of the Veda are (1) hymn and (2) ritual. The ritual portion admits of three sub-divisions, *viz.*, injunctive, persuasive and re-inculcative.

**(विधिः) विधायकः ॥ २।१।६४॥**

125. An injunction is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of action [as the means of attaining good].—64.

The following is an injunction:—"Let him who desires paradise perform the fire-sacrifice." This is a direct command.

**स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इति (अर्थवादः) ॥ २।१।६५॥**

126. Persuasion is effected through praise, blame, warning, and prescription.—65.

*Praise* is speech which persuades to a certain course of action by extolling its consequences, *e.g.*, "By the Sarvajit sacrifice gods conquered all, there is nothing like Sarvajit sacrifice, it enables us to obtain everything and to vanquish every one, etc." Here there is no direct command but the Sarvajit sacrifice is extolled in such a way that we are persuaded to perform it.

*Blame* is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting it, *e.g.*, "One who performs any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyotiṣṭoma falls into a pit and decays there." Here one is persuaded to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.

*Warning* is the mentioning of a course of action the obstruction of which by some particular person led to bad consequences, *e.g.*, on presenting oblation one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter afterwards, but alas! the Charaka priests first took the sprinkled butter which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc. Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the course.

*Prescription* implies the mention of some thing as commendable on account of its antiquity, *e.g.*, "By this the Brāhmanas recited the Sāma hymn, etc."

**विधिविहितस्यानुवचनम् (अनुवादः) ॥ २।१।६६॥**

127. Re-inculcation is the repetition of that which has been enjoined by an injunction.—66.

Re-inculcation may consist of (1) the repetition of an *injunction*, or (2) the repetition of that which has been *enjoined*. The first is called verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation. In the Veda