The Nyâya Sûtras of Gotama

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Futilities are as follows: (1) balancing the homogeneity, (2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the unanswerable, (7) balancing the alternative, (8) balancing the reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutual absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the counter-example, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing the doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason, (17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference, (19) balancing the demonstration, (20) balancing the perception, (21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternality, (23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.

Futility, which is a fallacious argument, has been in general terms defined in aphorism 1.2.18. The twenty four kinds of futility enunciated here will each be defined in due course. The fallacious characters of the twenty four kinds will also be exposed in separate aphorisms.

1. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called “balancing the homogeneity” or “balancing the heterogeneity.”—2.

2. That is, we say, to be established like a cow through cowhood (or cow-type).—3.

3. The argument, viz., sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the non-eternal sky which are mutually incompatible. The opposition, viz., sound is eternal, is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from the incorporeal pot which are alleged to be incompatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called “balancing the heterogeneity” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them.
The Naiyāyika says:—If the opposition referred to in the previous aphorism is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument—"sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot" the homogeneous example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternity, all products being non-eternal; but in the opposition—"sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky"—the homogeneous example sky does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternity because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal. A similar observation is to be made with regard to the opposition called “balancing an addition.” In the opposition “sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot” the heterogeneous example pot does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternity because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

**Balancing an addition.**—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called “balancing an addition.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

\[ \text{Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.} \]

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

\[ \text{Sound is non-eternal (but not audible), because it is a product, like a pot (which is non-eternal but not audible).} \]

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it cannot be audible, for a pot is not audible; and if sound is still held to be audible, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing a subtraction,” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

**Balancing a subtraction.**—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called “balancing a subtraction.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

\[ \text{Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.} \]

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

\[ \text{Sound is non-eternal (and corporeal), because it is a product, like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal).} \]

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it must also be corporeal like it; if it is not corporeal let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing an addition” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

**Balancing the questionable.**—If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called “balancing the questionable.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

\[ \text{Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.} \]
A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—
A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product, like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternity of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

Balancing the unquestionable.—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the unquestionable."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product, like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternity of a pot is held to be unquestionable, why is not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to render the argument unnecessary on the ground of its subject being of an unquestionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the unquestionable" which aims at showing the equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the example as well as of the subject.

Balancing the alternative.—If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative characters to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product, like sound.

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound being both products, one requires proof for its non-eternity as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot to be proved non-eternal by the examples of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternity or non-eternity of sound. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the reciprocity" which brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product, like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternity of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the questionable" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

Balancing the reciprocity.—If one opposes an argument by alleging a reciprocity of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the reciprocity."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal, because it is a product, like sound.

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound being both products, one requires proof for its non-eternity as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot to be proved non-eternal by the examples of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternity or non-eternity of sound. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the reciprocity" which brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

5. This is, we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality of their characters.—5.

The Naiyāyika says:—The futileities called "balancing an addition," "balancing a subtraction," "balancing the questionable," "balancing
the unquestionable” and “balancing the alternative” are all based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters.

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

In this argument although there is an equality of “sound” and “pot” in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a pot but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he be aware of the difference between the subject and the example only in those characters which are warranted by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called “balancing an addition” it is clear that the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product), because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal. Similarly with regard to the futility called “balancing a subtraction,” the reason (viz. being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in respect of their being not audible. As regards the futilities called “balancing the questionable” and “balancing the unquestionable,” we cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called “balancing the alternative” introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (viz. being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason (viz. being a product).

6. And because the example happens to surpass the subject.

The futility called “balancing the reciprocity” is based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as the subject. But that one surpasses the other is evident from aphorism 1-1-55 which states that the example does not stand in need of proof as to its characters.

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

7. If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being non-conducive to the predicate, be called “balancing the co-presence” or “balancing the mutual absence.”

The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke, because it has fire, like a kitchen.

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or is absent from that site. If the smoke is present with fire at the same site, there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is, in his opinion, as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the co-presence,” which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.
Balancing the mutual absence.—If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called “balancing the mutual absence.”

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke, because it has fire, like a kitchen.

The opponent asks: “Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?” “Such a supposition is indeed absurd.” The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the mutual absence” which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

9. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example not having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example, the opposition will be called “balancing the infinite regression” or “balancing the counter-example.”—9.

Balancing the infinite regression.—A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal, like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to lie non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternity of the pot is to be proved by further reasons. This gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition “sound is non-eternal” not less than the proposition “sound is eternal.” This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the infinite regression” which aims at stopping an argument by introducing an infinite regression which is said to beset the example.

Balancing the counter-example.—A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal, like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, why it should not be held to be eternal by the example of the sky? If the example of the sky is set aside, let the example of the pot too be set aside. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the counter-example” which aims at setting aside an argument by the introduction of a counter-example.

10. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.—10.
The Naiyāyikas say:

An example is a thing the characters of which are well-known to an ordinary man as well as to an expert. It does not require a series of reasons to reveal its own character or to reveal the character of the subject with which it stands in the relation of homogeneity or heterogeneity. In this respect it resembles a lamp which illuminates itself as well as the things lying within its reach.

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

In this argument the pot is the example which is so well-known that it requires no proof as to its being a product or being non-eternal.

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

Sound is non-eternal, like a pot.

In this argument the pot is the example which is so well-known that it requires no proof as to its being a product or being non-eternal.

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

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A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:

Sound is eternal, because it is a non-effect of effort, like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, viz., being an effect of effort, is not predicative of the subject, viz., sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being non-eternal on account of its being a non-effect of effort. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-produced" which pretends to show an equality of the arguments of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

12. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-produced."
type) being equally objects of perception, the opposition will be called “balancing the doubt.”—14.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

- Sound is non-eternal,
- because it is a product,
- like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

- Sound is non-eternal or eternal (?)
- because it is an object of perception,
- like a pot or pot-ness.

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot-ness insomuch as both are objects of perception; but the pot being non-eternal and pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the doubt” which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

15. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternity can be established by the homogeneity with the genus: a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.—15.

The Naiyāyika says:—

Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) but it must be pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. Though on the score of homogeneity we may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with as well as heterogeneity from other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

16. “Balancing the controversy” is an opposition which is conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.—16.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

- Sound is non-eternal,
- because it is a product,
- like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

- Sound is eternal,
- because it is audible.
- like soundness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, i.e., sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, i.e., audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), provokes the very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the controversy” which hurts an argument by giving rise to the very controversy which was to be settled.

17. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side.—17.

The Naiyāyika says:—The opposition called “balancing the controversy” cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

18. “Balancing the non-reason” is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.—18.
A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here "being a product" is the reason or sign for "being non-eternal" which is the predicate or significate.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate.

(a) The reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or significate) because the former gets its name only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishment of the predicate.

(b) The reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate) because what would be the use of the former if it existed already.

(c) The reason (or sign) and the predicate (or significate) cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-reason" which aims at stopping an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

19. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.—19.

The Naiyayika says:—The knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which is to be established take place from reason which must precede that which is to be known and that which is to be established.

20. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.—20.

It being impossible for the opposition to precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with that which is to be opposed, the opposition itself is invalid and consequently the original argument holds good.

If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption, the opposition will be called "balancing the presumption."—21.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is presumed to be eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal on account of its homogeneity with non-eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being incorporeal). This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the presumption" which aims at stopping an argument by setting presumption as a balance against it.

22 If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion.—22.

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion:—

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.
This would hurt the opposition itself. In fact the presumption as adduced by the opponent is erratic. If one says that "sound is non-eternal because of its homogeneity with non-eternal things", the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things" and vice versa. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable.

23. If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property notated by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property on account of their being existent: this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."—23.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If the pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality in consequence of their both being products, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property in consequence of their being existent. Therefore, no difference existing between the eternal and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference" which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non-different.

24. This is, we say, no opposition because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in other instances not to abide in it.—24.

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

In this argument "all things" being the subject, there is nothing left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternity abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent-things. Hence all things are not mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing the non-difference" is unreasonable.

25. If an opposition is offered by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration."—25.

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternity of sound as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternity of sound as follows:—

Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky.

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternity of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternity
of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration."

26. This is, we say, no opposition because there is an admission of the first demonstration.—26.

27. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called "balancing the perception."—27.

28. This is, we say, no opposition because that character can be ascertained by other means as well.—28.

29. If against an argument proving the non-existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-perception."—29.

30. The reasoning through non-perception is not, we say, sound, because non-perception is merely the negation of perception.—30.

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31. There is, moreover, an internal perception of the existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds of knowledge.—31.

There are internal perceptions of such forms as "I am sure," "I am not sure," "I have doubts," "I have no doubt" etc., which prove that we can perceive the non-existence of knowledge as well as the existence of
thereof. Hence the non-perception itself is perceptible, and as there is no non-perception of non-perception, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" falls to the ground.

32. If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argument by attributing non-eternity to all things, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-eternality."—32.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is a product,

like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If sound is non-eternal on account of its being homogeneous with a pot which is non-eternal, it will follow as a consequence that all things are non-eternal because they are in some one or other respect homogeneous with the pot—a consequence which will render all inferences impossible for want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-eternality" which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

33. The opposition, we say, is unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is opposed.—33.

The Naiyāyika says:—

We cannot ascertain the character of a thing from its mere homogeneity with another thing: in doing so we must consider the logical connection between the reason and the predicate. Sound, for instance, is non-eternal not merely because it is homogeneous with a non-eternal pot but because there is a universal connection between "being a product" and "being non-eternal." Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homogeneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore not founded on a sound basis.

34. There is, we say, no non-distinction, because the reason is known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the predicate and because it is applied in both ways.—34.

The Naiyāyika says that we are not justified in concluding that all things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which "all things" may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion we must consider the reason as being that character of the example (and consequently of the subject) which bears a universal connection with the character of the predicate. The pot possesses no such character in common with "all things." The reason moreover is applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous ways. We cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the subject with the example in a certain respect. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore unreasonable.

35. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternity to all non-eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non-eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."—35.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is a product,

like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—You say that sound is non-eternal. Does this non-eternality exist in sound always or only sometimes? If the non-eternality exists always, the sound must also be always existent, or in other words, sound is eternal. If the non-eternality exists only sometimes, then too the sound must in the absence
of non-eternity be pronounced to be eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the eternal" which counteracts an argument by setting up eternity as a balance against it.

36. This, we say, no opposition because the thing opposed is always non-eternal on account of the eternity of the non-eternal.-36.

The Naiyāyika says:

By speaking of eternity of the non-eternal you have admitted bound to be always non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternity. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other: by admitting that bound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence "balancing the eternal" is not a sound opposition.

37. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effects of effort, the opposition will be called "balancing the effect."-37.

A certain person to prove the non-eternity of bound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The effect of effort is found to be of two kinds, viz. (1) the production of something which was previously non-existent, e.g. a pot, and (2) the revelation of something already existing, e.g. water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind? If sound is an effect of the first kind it will be non-eternal but if it is of the second kind it will be eternal. Owing to this diversity of the effects of effort, it is not possible to conclude that sound is non-eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the effect."

38. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect, because there was no cause of non-perception.—38.

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The Naiyāyika answers the opposition called "balancing the effect" as follows:—

We cannot say that sound is revealed by our effort because we are unable to prove that it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but produced.

39. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.—39.

A certain person argued:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person opposed it saying that bound would not be non-eternal if "effect" meant a thing revealed.

The Naiyāyika observes that if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special ground to suppose that the "effect" in the argument signified "a thing produced and not revealed", so also there is no special ground to suppose that the word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect" is self-destructive.

40. Thus everywhere.—40.

If a special meaning is to be attached to the opposition, the same meaning will have to be attached to the original argument. In this respect there will be an equality of the two sides in the case of all kinds of opposition such as "balancing the homogeneity" etc.

41. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.—41.

A certain person to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect of effort.
A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds offers an opposition thus:

Sound is eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

(Here "effect" may mean "a thing revealed by effort.")

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced by effort.")

The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean a thing revealed by effort). So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

42. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion."—52.

A certain person lays down a proposition which is opposed by a certain other person. The first person, viz. the disputant charges the opposition made by the second person, viz. the opponent, with a defect, e.g. that the reason is erratic. The opponent instead of rescuing his opposition from the defect with which it has been charged by the disputant, goes on charging the disputant's opposition of the opposition with the same defect. The counter-charge which the opponent brings in this way is interpreted by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called "admission of an opinion."

43. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.
charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

This is the sixth wing.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. The sixth wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of "admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential.

The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special meaning, *sīkṣa*, a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.

The disputant and the opponent instead of stopping at the proper limit has carried on their disputation through six wings beyond which no further wing is possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.

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1. The occasions for rebuke are the following:


The definition of "an occasion for rebuke" has been given in aphorism 1-2-19. "An occasion for rebuke" which is the same as "a ground of defeat," "a place of humiliation" or "a point of disgrace" arises generally in connection with the proposition or any other part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is a discusser, wrangler or caviler.

"Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter-example.—45.

A disputant argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal.

Because it is cognisable by sense,

Whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal

as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense,

Therefore sound is non-eternal.
A certain other person offers an opposition thus:

A genus (e.g., potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense, is found to be eternal, why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by sense, be eternal?

The disputant being thus opposed says:

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense, Therefore sound is eternal.

By thus admitting in his example (pot) the character of a counter-example (genus or type), he has hurt his own proposition (viz. sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

A certain person argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal, because it is cognisable by sense like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus:

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so a sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal. The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the meaning of his proposition thus:

"Who says that sound is non-eternal?"

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called "renouncing the proposition" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

3. "Shifting the proposition" arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter-example.—46.

A certain person argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal, because it is cognisable by sense like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus:

Sound is eternal, because it is cognisable by sense like a genus (or type).

The first person, in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and the other is not so: hence the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition. The proposition originally laid down was:

Sound is non-eternal, while the proposition now defended is:

Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

A person who shifts his proposition in this way is to be rebuked in as much as he has not relied upon his original reason and example.

4. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.—47.

Substance is distinct from quality, because it is perceived to be non-distinct from colour etc. In this argument it is to be observed that if substance is distinct from quality, it must also be distinct from colour etc. which constitute the quality. The reason viz. substance is non-distinct from colour etc., is opposed to the proposition, viz. substance is distinct from quality. A person who thus employs a reason which opposes his proposition is to be rebuked as a fool.

5. A proposition being opposed if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."—48.

A certain person argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal, because it is cognisable by sense,

A certain other person offers an opposition thus:

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so a sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal. The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the meaning of his proposition thus:

"Who says that sound is non-eternal?"

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called "renouncing the proposition" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternity of sound, argues as follows:

Sound is non-eternal, because it is cognisable by sense.

6. "Shifting the reason" occurs when the reason of a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it.—49.
A certain other person says that sound cannot be proved to be non-eternal through the mere reason of its being cognizable by sense, just as a genus (or type) such as pot-ness (or pot-type) is cognizable by sense and is not yet non-eternal.

The first person defends himself by saying that the reason, viz., being cognizable by sense, is to be understood as signifying that which comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognizable by sense. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same time cognizable by sense; but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pot-type does not come under another genus or type such as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type) though it is cognizable by sense. Such a defence, which consists in shifting one's reason, rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

7. "Shifting the topic" is an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant.—50.

A certain person, to prove the eternity of sound, argues as follows:

Sound is eternal (proposition), because it is intangible (reason).

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence of any other resource, to defend his position as follows:—

Hetu, which is the Sanskrit equivalent for "reason," is a word derived from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be a noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc. etc.

The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

8. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters into a series.—51.

A certain person, to prove the eternity of sound, argues as follows:

Sound is eternal
because k, c, t and p are j, v, g, q and d, like jh, bh, gh, qh and dh.

As the letters k, c, t etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

9. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.—52.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "the unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

10. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.—53.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defence, argues as follows:—

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents on occasion for rebuke.

11. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.—54.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:

"The hill has fire (proposition),
Whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
Because it has smoke (reason).
The hill has fire (conclusion).
The hill has smoke (application).

This sort of argument is called "the inopportune" which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke. Since the meaning of an argument is affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who overlooks the order cannot establish his conclusion and is therefore rebuked.
12. If an argument lacks even one of its parts, it is called “saying too little.”—\(55\).

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts:—
1. The hill has fire (proposition),
2. Because it has smoke (reason),
3. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
4. The hill has smoke (application),
5. Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

As all the five parts or members are essential, a person who omits even one of them should be scolded as “saying too little.”

13. “Saying too much” is an argument which consists of more than one reason or example.—\(56\).

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—
The hill has fire (proposition),
Because it has smoke (reason),
And because it has light (reason),
like a kitchen (example),
and like a furnace (example),
In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person, who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage), employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as “saying too much.”

14. “Repetition” is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculation) the word or the meaning is said over again.—\(57\).

Repetition of the word—Sound is non-eternal,
sound is non-eternal.
Repetition of the meaning—Sound is non-eternal,
echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent, etc.

A person who unnecessarily commits repetition is to be rebuked as a fool.

Reinculation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-66.

15. In reinculation there is no repetition in as much as a special meaning is deduced from the word which is repeated.—\(58\).

The hill has fire (proposition),
Because it has smoke (reason),
All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
The hill has smoke (application),
Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

In this argument the “conclusion” is a mere repetition of the “proposition” and yet it serves a special purpose.

16. “Repetition” consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.—\(59\).

“A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal” —this is a mere repetition of the following:—
“A thing not possessing the character of a product is not non-eternal.”

17. “Silence” is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.—\(60\).

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent is therefore to be rebuked.

18. “Ignorance” is the non-understanding of a proposition.—\(61\).

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the know-
ledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand? He is to be rebuked for his ignorance.

19. "Non-ingenious" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply. --62.

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity.

20. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument in the pretext of going away to attend another business. --63.

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion.

21. "The admission of an opinion" consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists in one's own side. --64.

A certain person addressing another person says: "You are a thief."

The other person replies: "You too are a thief."

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of "admission of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it.

22. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke. --65.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his short-coming, it is the duty of the audience to pass a vote of censure on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the censurable."

23. "Censuring the non-censurable" consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke. --66.

A person brings discredit on himself if he rebukes a person who does not deserve rebuke.

24. A person who after accepting a tenet departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet." --67.

A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sankhya philosophy which lays down that (1) what is existent never becomes non-existent, and (2) what is non-existent never comes into existence etc. A certain other person opposes him by saying that all human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and non-existence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.

25. "The fallacies of a reason" already explained do also furnish occasions for rebuke. --68.

From aphorism 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere semblances of a reason. A person who employs them in a disputation does certainly deserve rebuke.

There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.
Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect in the operator (officiating priest) consists in his not being a learned man, and defect in the materials consists in the fuel being wet, butter being not fresh, remuneration (to the officiating priest) being small, etc. A son is sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice if these defects are avoided. Therefore there is no untruth in the Veda.

An injunction is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of action [as the means of attaining good].

Persuasion is effected through praise, blame, warning, and prescription.

Praise is speech which persuades to a certain course of action by extolling its consequences, e.g., "By the Sarvajit sacrifice gods conquered all, there is nothing like Sarvajit sacrifice, it enables us to obtain everything and to vanquish every one, etc." Here there is no direct command but the Sarvajit sacrifice is extolled in such a way that we are persuaded to perform it.

Blame is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting it, e.g., "One who performs any other sacrifice neglecting the Jyotistoma falls into a pit and decays there." Here one is persuaded to perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.

Warning is the mentioning of a course of action the obstruction of which by some particular person led to bad consequences, e.g., on presenting oblation one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter afterwards, but alas! the Charaka priests first took the sprinkled butter which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc. Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the course.

Prescription implies the mention of some thing commendable on account of its antiquity, e.g., "By this the Brahmanas recited the Sáma hymn, etc."

Re-inculcation is the repetition of that which has been enjoined by an injunction.

The two main divisions of the Veda are (1) hymn and (2) ritual. The ritual portion admits of three sub-divisions, viz., injunctive, persuasive and re-inculcative.